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The AICPA recently finished a harmonization 
project to converge U.S. audit standards with those 
of the International Audit and Assurance Standards 
Board.  The assumption implicit in this project is 
that users of financial statements will benefit from a 
converged, or consistent set of audit standards.  
Additionally, the AICPA’s clarified auditing 
standard AU-C700, Audit Conclusions and 
Reporting, now requires explicit acknowledgement 
of the auditor’s responsibility for fraud procedures 
in the auditor’s report, which is the focus of 
advisory committees in both the U.S. Department of 
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Treasury and the European Commission.  Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to investigate how users 
(U.S. and French) rate a harmonized audit 
communication.  Specifically, we test perceptions of 
the auditor’s internal control report using the 
PCAOB’s AS2 report.  Results indicate that U.S. 
and French users rate the report similarly, with no 
significant differences along dimensions of 
readability, reliability, and liability.  Additionally, 
we investigate how user perceptions change when 
evaluating a report that contains wording as to the 
auditor’s fraud detection responsibility.  Results 
indicate that while U.S. users’ perceptions increase 
positively when fraud wording is added, French 
perceptions remain unchanged.  Overall, our results 
suggest that both U.S. and non-U.S. users perceive 
the information from an auditor’s internal control 
report the same.  However, specific wording 
changes (like fraud) do not universally increase 
positive perceptions perhaps because of country-




The harmonization of financial accounting and reporting 
standards has received much attention over the last few years (for 
example, Daske et al., 2008; Hail et al., 2010a, 2010b; Bradshaw et 
al., 2010).  A much less public harmonization project, however, 
has recently been concluded by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA).  This Clarity Project rewrote every 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) to converge as far as 
possible with International Standards on Auditing (ISA).  During 
the Clarity Project, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board 
harmonized its agenda with the International Audit and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) in an effort to converge U.S. GAAS 
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with international standards.  This Clarity Project is an important 
step in the globalization of auditing standards.  As such, the 
purpose of this research is to compare perceptions of harmonized 
audit communications across U.S. and non-U.S. users. 
In particular, we use the auditor’s internal control report as 
an example of a harmonized audit communication.  Since the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, internal control 
reporting has been a much debated topic in the U.S. and Europe 
(Baker, 2005; Gornik-Tomaszewski & McCarthy, 2005; Baker, 
2006).  In particular, the European Commission (EC) has issued 
what is referred to as EuroSox, amendments to the Fourth, Seventh 
and Eight directives.  Related to internal control reporting, these 
revised directives require company directors to describe their 
internal control processes in annual reports.  While these 
requirements stop short of requiring an external audit opinion, they 
do require external auditors to ensure the reports are consistent 
with the company’s financial statements and require that external 
auditors provide the audit committee with an annual report on 
internal control (Baker, 2005).   
Additionally, the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection 
has received much global attention.  During the timeframe of the 
Clarity Project the IAASB issued ISA 240 (redrafted), The 
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of 
Financial Statements in 2006 and the AICPA issued SAS 113, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, in 2007.  
Both standards require auditors to design and perform audit 
procedures to detect and prevent material misstatements due to 
fraud (Selley & Turner, 2004) with an emphasis on procedures 
designed to understand internal controls related to financial 
reporting (Ramos, 2003).     
Furthermore, the AICPA recently issued clarified statement 
AU-C 700, Audit Conclusions and Reporting, which prescribes a 
revised auditor’s report to include: (i) management’s responsibility 
to implement “internal control relevant to the preparation and fair 
presentation of financial statements that are free from material 
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misstatement, whether due to fraud or error” and (ii) auditor’s 
responsibility for designing audit procedures depending on the 
“auditor’s judgment, including the assessment of the risks of 
material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to 
fraud or error.”1   
Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold.  First, 
given the move toward the globalization of audit standards, the 
study investigates non-U.S. user’s perceptions of the auditor’s 
internal control report and compares those perceptions to a sample 
of U.S. users.  Second, the study examines the impact of fraud 
wording on non-U.S. users’ evaluation of the report.  Previous 
research on U.S. users suggests that the inclusion of fraud detection 
wording enhances users’ evaluation of the report when compared 
to the mandated report that does not contain such wording (Foster 
et al., 2010). 
In this regard, we obtained and analyzed data using a 
between-subjects experiment with 92 U.S. and 72 French subjects 
as proxies for financial statement users.  Subjects were MBA 
students from a university in the Midwest region of the United 
States and senior level accounting/finance students from a 
university in the north of France.  Participants were asked to 
evaluate one of three auditor report formats on internal control 
effectiveness over financial reporting: the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) AS2 mandated report with 
a limitations paragraph (labeled as AS), the AS report without the 
limitations paragraph (labeled as NL), and the NL report with fraud 
wording (labeled as FW).   
Based on the results of similar prior work (e.g., Foster et 
al., 2005; Foster, et al., 2010) participants’ responses to survey 
questions about the three auditor’s report formats (AS, NL, & FW) 
were collapsed into three perceptual dimensions: readability, 
reliability and auditor liability.  Results of analyses indicate that 
                                                 
1 AU-C 700, Audit Conclusions and Reporting, will become effective for audits 
of financial statements for the year ending on or after December 15, 2012. 
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perceptions of French and U.S. users’ do not differ when 
evaluating the prescribed PCAOB report on internal controls (AS 
format).  Perceptions do differ, however, when fraud wording is 
added to the report (FW format).  In particular, U.S. users’ 
perceptions about the FW format are significantly 
favorable/positive, while French users’ perceptions remain 
unchanged. 
Overall, we expand the growing literature on accounting 
harmonization by adding audit harmonization into the discussion.  
To date, we are aware of no study that investigates the potential 
impact of audit harmonization on users’ perceptions of audit 
communications.  Additionally, our study complements previous 
studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Beneish et al, 2008; 
Hammersley et al., 2008; Schneider and Church, 2008; Lopez et 
al., 2009) that suggest an auditor’s internal control report provides 
information to users that is value relevant.  By documenting that 
U.S. and French users’ rate the PCAOB report similarly, our results 
suggest that an auditor’s internal control report could provide value 
relevant information to users outside the U.S.   
Moreover, the inferences drawn from the evidence in this 
study are useful to regulators, especially when confronted with the 
impact this audit harmonization project between the AICPA and 
IAASB may have on the PCAOB.  Specifically, the Clarity Project 
is the first complete redrafting and recodification of U.S. audit 
standards since 1972 (Morris & Thomas, 2011).  Since the PCAOB 
has remained silent on the issue of harmonized auditing standards, 
the impact of this globalization on U.S. public companies is 
unknown.   
The PCAOB, however, does review its audit standards for 
revision based on its independent analyses of the continuing 
applicability of existing interim standards, PCAOB inspections, 
and economic developments (Morris & Thomas, 2011).  Evidence 
that U.S. and French users rate the internal control report similarly 
provides support to the PCAOB their report format benefits a 
potentially diverse user group and may help to shape any 
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harmonization of their standards and globalization of audit 
reporting. 
Furthermore, the differing U.S. and French perceptions 
regarding the inclusion of fraud wording in the internal control 
report would be useful to regulators as they raise concerns about 
the adequacy of audit reports.  Specifically, the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 
recommended the PCAOB clarify in the audit report the auditor’s 
role in detecting fraud.2   
Additionally, the European Commission and the Audit 
Practices Board of the United Kingdom are currently discussing 
potential changes to their respective auditor reports (Grant, 2008) 
due to user misperceptions, among other things, regarding the 
auditor’s responsibility for fraud (Gray et al., 2011).  Evidence that 
fraud wording in an auditor’s internal control report enhances U.S. 
users’ perceptions and not French users’ perceptions highlights the 
country-specific legal and institutional traditions that have shaped 
audit policy and therefore, would shape audit harmonization.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The 
next section presents the background and research questions.  The 
third section discusses the research methodology, while the fourth 
section presents the results of our statistical tests.  The paper is 
concluded in section five. 
 
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The AICPA has historically heralded internal control 
reports as way to strengthen an entity’s internal control framework 
and reduce financial statement fraud (Cohen Commission, 1978; 
Treadway Commission 1987; COSO 1992).  While those various 
                                                 
2  Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession – Report dated October 6, 
2008, Part VII, Firm Structure & Finances – Recommendation #5.  
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/index.shtml 
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commissions recommended management and auditor reports on 
internal controls, the requirement was not mandated in the U.S. 
until passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002
3
.  So, while the reporting 
requirement is relatively new, the concepts and framework (i.e., 
COSO) associated with internal controls are well-developed in the 
U.S. 
In France, internal control reports are mandated by article 
117 of the Financial Security Act (Loi Sẻcuritẻ Financiẻre) of 2003 
(LSF).  According to the Financial Markets’ Authority (Autoritẻ 
des Marchẻs Financiers, AMF hereafter), these standards require 
the Chairman of the Board of Directors to give an account on the 
internal control procedures the company has implemented (AMF 
2007).  Article 120 of the LSF requires the external auditors to 
present a report of their observations of the Chairman’s report 
regarding the processing of accounting information (AMF 2007).   
The framework used to assess internal controls, however, 
was neither clearly defined nor mandated.  In fact, companies could 
choose from a range of internal control frameworks as defined by 
COSO, AFEP/MEDEF (the joint guidelines of the French 
Association of Private Companies, Association Française des 
Entreprises Privẻes, and the French Business Confederation, 
Mouvement des Entreprises de France), CNCC (the French 
National Society of Auditors or Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes), and IIA/IFACI (the joint guidelines 
of the Institute of Internal Auditors and the French counterpart the 
Institut Français des l’Audit et du Contrôle Internes).  Given the 
lack of a standard definition of internal control, only 33% of 
companies indicated the standard they used to compile their 
internal control report in 2005 (AMF 2006).  In contrast, the 
PCAOB standards (AS2 and AS5 which replaced AS2) on 
auditor’s internal control reporting mandate the use of the criteria 
based on COSO.   
                                                 
3 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 is an 
exception requiring such reporting for all U.S. financial depository institutions 
with assets over $500 million. 
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As such, the AMF created a working group in 2005 to 
develop an internal control framework for use by French 
companies to meet the obligations of the LSF.  The resulting 
framework uses principles set forth by COSO and the British 
Turnbull guidance and was written to ensure compliance with 







directives.  As a result, in 2008 73% of companies reference an 
internal control framework in their report, with the AMF 
framework, COSO or some combination of the two being the 
overwhelming framework referenced (AMF 2008). 
 
U.S. Versus French Perceptions of Internal Control Reports 
How different countries create, disclose and use accounting 
information has been a source of research for many years.  Much of 
that research has focused on the legal institutions of finance—the 
legal origin of shareholder protection and the quality of its 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998).  This topic was operationalized 
as the importance of equity markets using an aggregation of three 
variables: the ratio of aggregate stock market capitalization to gross 
national product, the number of listed domestic firms relative to the 
population and the number of initial public offerings relative to the 
population (La Porta et al., 1997).   
This equity market importance variable is constructed such 
that a higher score indicates a greater importance of the stock 
market.  It has been used in studies related to international 
comparisons of earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) and 
differences in domestic accounting standards and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (Ding et al., 2007).  Both studies 
conclude that the importance of equity markets is positively related 
to better quality accounting information because the information 
needs of outside shareholders limits insiders’ incentives to 
manipulate accounting information. 
An implication of those findings is that users of accounting 
information in similarly ranked countries would require similar 
types of information.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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non-U.S. firms voluntarily disclose IFRS financial information in 
an attempt to lower the information asymmetry component of their 
cost of capital.  Ashbaugh (2001) finds that non-U.S. firms are 
more likely to disclose IFRS financial information when 
participating in seasoned equity offerings.   Ding et al. (2007) find 
that divergence, not absence, from prescribed IFRS is a result of 
firms providing richer, firm-specific information to the capital 
markets.  
In those studies cited above, the U.S. and France are on two 
ends of the spectrum related to the importance of equity markets.  
Leuz et al., (2003) using data from La Porta et al., (1997), which 
was collected in 1994, report that the U.S. has an equity market 
importance of 23.3, while France has an index of 9.3
4
.  French 
capital markets, however, have been transformed since that data 
was collected.  The country has gone through a competitive 
disinflation policy, forcing large firms to the market, rather than 
the government, for resources (Amable & Hanckẻ, 2001).  In 
addition, deregulation of the capital markets was initiated with the 
European Transparency Directive which was codified into French 
law in 1988.  Since the codification of that directive, the pattern of 
shareholding has changed where the degree of bank dependence in 
the capital markets has declined (Kremp et al., 1999).   In addition, 
this deregulation opened the door for foreign institutional investors 
(Morin, 2000).   
Thus, measures of equity market importance in France have 
changed since 1994.  We calculated a more recent equity market 
importance factor for this study.  In 2009, the U.S. had an equity 
market importance factor 15.45 while France had a factor of 
16.01
5
. While the French equity markets have increased in 
                                                 
4 Countries higher than the U.S. are Switzerland (24.8), Malaysia (25.3), the UK 
(25.0), Hong Kong (28.8) and Singapore (28.8).  Countries lower than France 
are Indonesia (4.7), Germany (5.0), Philippines (5.7), Italy (6.5), Austria (7.0), 
and Spain (7.2).  All values are reported in Leuz et al. (2003). 
5 Data was collected for every year from 1995 to 2009 for the U.S., France and 
all members of the EC.  Information about country population, gross domestic 
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importance, it would be misleading to say the U.S. and France have 
the same market structure.  Rather, France is described as having 
moved from “state-managed” capitalism to “state-led” capitalism 
where the government still plays an active, although smaller role 
than in years before (Schmidt, 2003).  The French approach is 
described as selective, based on social compromise (Lee & Yoo, 
2008). 
Notwithstanding the differences in market structure, equity 
markets are important in both the U.S. and France.  As such, we 
would expect users of financial information in both countries to 
find reports on internal controls over financial reporting to be 
useful, since the internal control reports reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.  Thus, the first research 
question is as follows: 
Research question 1:  Do French and U.S. users’ 
perceptions of the internal control report differ? 
 
The Auditor’s Environment 
User’s perceptions of an auditor’s audit communication are 
influenced by the environment in which the auditor performs her 
work.  Two aspects of the auditor’s environment that are applicable 
to the internal control report are the auditor’s responsibility for 
fraud and the auditor’s liability to third parties. 
 
The Auditor’s Responsibility for Fraud Detection.  The 
auditor’s failure to meet public expectations regarding the auditor’s 
responsibility for fraud detection is an on-going source of 
confusion between users and auditors (DeJong & Smith, 1984; 
Hooks et al., 1994) and has been documented as the source of 
confusion in the U.K. (Humphrey et al., 1993), Australia (Low, 
1980), and New Zealand (Porter, 1983).  In the U.S., similar 
studies have been performed that lend credibility to fraud detection 
                                                                                                             
product, and listed domestic firms was collected from the World Bank.  Data 
about initial public offerings was collected from Bloomberg. 
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responsibility as the source of confusion.  For example, Epstein 
and Geiger (1994) found that stockholders perceived auditors as 
providing absolute assurance against fraud.  Frank et al. (2001) 
found significant differences between auditors and jurors regarding 
fraud detection.  Jurors view the auditing profession as a public 
watchdog, actively searching for fraud.  This confusion could lead 
to a decline in the auditor’s usefulness to society (Carmichael, 
2004). 
Little research, however, has been devoted to user 
perceptions of auditor fraud detection responsibility in France.  
According to Jedidi and Richard (2009) French auditing research 
has mainly focused on audit quality (Richard, 2000), auditor 
independence (Mikol & Standish, 1998) and audit history (Mikol, 
1993; Bocqueraz, 2000; Ramirez, 2005).  One study, however, has 
investigated auditor responsibility for fraud detection.  Carassus 
and Cormier (2003) found that French auditors who design their 
tests more in-line with U.S. fraud standards are more likely to 
detect fraud. 
To date, no study has assessed French users’ attitudes 
regarding the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection.  This 
scarcity of research may be the result of the way in which auditor 
responsibility is written into French law.  Jedidi and Richard 
(2009) provide a thorough review of user and auditor confusion 
surrounding the audit function.  In their review, however, the 
auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection is not listed as a reason 
for the expectation differences.  In their estimation this may be 
because French law requires auditors who discover some breach of 
the law to report it to the public prosecutor.  Thus, Jedidi and 
Richard (2009) conclude that in addition to certifying accounts, 
French auditors are also expected to detect fraud. 
 
 The Auditor’s Responsibility to Third Parties.  The 
auditor’s legal environment, whether created through the court 
system or legislative branch, establishes the level of liability 
auditor’s face as a consequence of their audit reporting.  In the U.S. 
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an auditor’s duty to third parties is a matter of state law, rather than 
national law (Chung et al., 2010).  Each state, therefore, has the 
discretion to define a third party: either restrictive in that privity 
must exist, or open, to include all foreseeable parties.  Only two 
states, however, use the most liberal definition of third party 
liability, with the overwhelming majority of states limiting who 
can be classified as a third party (Louwers et al., 2011).  Thus, U.S. 
auditors are typically held responsible to the providers of capital 
(creditors and shareholders).  
 In France, the general basis for an auditor’s (commissaire 
aux comptes) liability is specified in the Code Civil and is 
specifically regulated under article 234, section 1, of the Loi sur les 
Sociẻtẻs Commercials no. 66-537, which was adopted in 1966 
(Baker & Quick, 1996).  With this codification, the auditor’s status 
changed from contractual (individual shareholders’ interest) to 
statutory (general interest of the public) (Khoury, 2001).  Auditor 
liability, therefore, is broadly defined since their work is viewed to 
be in the public interest (Khoury, 2001).  Since third parties do not 
have to be specifically known, France uses the most liberal 
definition of a third party, the reasonable foreseeability standard 
(Chung, et al., 2010).   
An open question, therefore, is how French users will 
perceive explicit acknowledgement of the auditor’s responsibility 
for fraud in an audit communication.  Previous research has shown 
that U.S. users perceive more positively the auditor’s internal 
control report with the inclusion of fraud wording (Foster, et al., 
2010).  Consequently, we present the following research question 
to explore non-professional users’ perceptions about the auditor’s 
fraud detection responsibility: 
Research question 2:  Does the inclusion of wording 
referencing the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection 
enhance both U.S. and French users’ perception of the 
internal control report?   
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The research questionnaire was developed as a variation of 
the semantic differential technique used in accounting by Haried 
(1972, 1973) and originally developed by Osgood et al. (1971) to 
measure the connotative meaning of a concept.  Osgood et al. 
(1971) proposed that the meaning underlying a construct has three 
dominant dimensions.  Houghton (1987, 1988) found that these 
three underlying dimensions applied to accounting, what Houghton 
and Messier (1991) identified as evaluative, obligatory, and 
potency.  Prior studies have similarly found user perceptions of 
audit reports to have three stable underlying dimensions.  Monroe 
and Woodliff (1993, 1994) identified these dimensions as 
responsibility, reliability and prospects, while Gay et al. (1998) 
referred to the dimensions as responsibility, reliability, and 
decisions usefulness.    
In this study, the questionnaire was developed to measure 
perceptions of the message communicated through an auditor’s 
internal control report.  The eleven questions used were developed 
based on prior literature regarding audit communications (Libby 
1979; Nair and Rittenberg, 1987; Kelly and Mohrweis, 1989) and 
has been used in prior research (e.g., Foster, et al., 2005; Foster, et 
al., 2010).  Deriving measures used in this study from existing 
research helps to ensure their construct validity (O’Leary-Kelly & 
Vokorka, 1998).   The motivation behind the readability dimension 
is to determine if U.S. and French users have differing perceptions 
as to the purpose of the report, and to determine if those 
perceptions would be reinforced or reduced by including fraud 
language.  Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) used similar questions to 
assess the understandability of an audit report.   
The reliability dimension is used to capture and compare 
the degree of reliance U.S. and French users have on the internal 
control system to produce financial statements that are not 
materially misstated.  Additionally, to the extent in which fraud 
wording is more descriptive of the audit process, it could provide 
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more information concerning the dependability of the financial 
statements.  Libby (1979) and Nair and Rittenberg (1987) 
identified a similar dimension which they referred to as the user’s 
need for additional information and the usefulness of the financial 
statements, respectively.   
The third dimension, liability, captures U.S. and French 
users’ perceptions of the extent the auditor is assuming legal 
liability for the adequacy of the internal control structure.  The 
auditor’s report provides readers with an understanding as to the 
relative responsibilities assumed by management and the auditor.   
To the extent fraud wording provides additional or new 
information about what an auditor is doing, it may change users’ 
perception of the relative responsibility of auditors and 
management to establish and maintain a system of internal controls 
over financial reporting.  Nair and Rittenberg (1987) and Kelly and 




Participants and Design 
The data was collected in 2009 from 92 MBA students 
from an urban university in the Midwest area of the United States 
and 72 senior-level accounting/finance students from a university 
in the north of France.  Three internal control report formats are 
used in this study
6
.  The first, labeled AS, is the format prescribed 
by the PCAOB in AS2, which includes a limitations paragraph.  
Version two, labeled NL, is the similar to AS but does not contain 
a limitations paragraph.  The final version, labeled FW, is similar 
to the NL format but contains fraud wording language (e.g., we 
plan and perform an examination to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the Company’s internal control is sufficient to 
detect/prevent material errors, irregularities, or fraud). 
                                                 
6 The three versions of the report with survey questions are in the Appendix at 
the end of the paper.  A complete set of survey material packet items can be 
obtained from the authors. 
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The participants were asked the eleven questions using a 
between-subjects design since prior research has demonstrated that 
subjects can become oversensitive to the variables being tested 
with a within-subjects design (Pany and Reckers 1987).  
Additionally, a context-free frame of reference is used to minimize 
the potential confounding effects and potential biasing that 
including additional information about either the client or the 
auditor might create.   
Therefore, an entire set of financial statements is not 
presented with the auditor’s internal control report as this would 
have unnecessarily increased the length of the survey and 
potentially distracted participants’ from the focus of the study.  
Prior studies have used this approach (Pany and Reckers, 1987; 
Kelly and Mohrweis, 1989; Yardley 1989; Hasan et al., 2003) and 
report that users did not have difficulty completing the task in a 
context-free framework.    
Of interest in this study is the impact report format has on 
users’ perceptions of the internal control report along the 
readability, reliability and liability dimensions.  To test research 
question 1, we compare French users’ perceptions to those of U.S. 
users’ perceptions along the identified dimensions using the AS 
format of the report.  Previous studies have shown that user 
perceptions can be affected by report formatting (Hasan et al., 
2003) and wording changes (Bailey et al., 1983; Kelly and 
Mohrweis, 1989; Houghton and Messier, 1991).  Therefore, we test 
research question 2, by comparing French and U.S. responses to 




We initially performed a MANOVA, with Bonferroni 
adjustment, on the data to determine the effects of two user groups 
(French and U.S.) and three treatment variables (AS, NL, and FW) 
on three dependent variables (readability, reliability, and liability).  
The MANOVA results are summarized in Panel A of Table 1.  We 
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find that ratings of internal control reports are affected by country 
(p= 0.038), not by report type (p= 0.328), but there is a moderately 
significant interaction (p=0.083) between country and report type. 
Because MANOVA results were significant, we performed 
ANOVAs to analyze each of the dependent variables (readability, 
reliability, and liability).  The ANOVA results are reported in 
Panels B, C, and D of Table 1.  Country is significant for the 
readability (p= 0.028) and liability (p= 0.027) dimensions, report 
type is significant only for the reliability dimension (p=0.051), and 
the interaction term is significant in the readability (p= 0.070) and 
reliability dimension (p= 0.011).   
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MANOVA and ANOVA results 





Country 0.95 2.88 0.038 
Report type 0.96 1.16 0.328 
Interaction 0.93 1.89 0.083 
    
Panel B: ANOVA results for the readability dimension 
Effect Mean square F-value p-Value 
Country 5.84 4.92 0.028 
Report type 2.19 1.84 0.162 
Interaction 3.22 2.71 0.070 
    
Panel C: ANOVA results for the reliability dimension 
Effect Mean square F-value p-Value 
Country 0.52 0.52 0.474 
Report type 2.98 3.03 0.051 
Interaction 4.59 4.66 0.011 
    
Panel D: ANOVA results for the liability dimension 
Effect Mean square F-value p-Value 
Country 4.89 4.93 0.027 
Report type 0.29 0.30 0.743 
Interaction 0.08 0.08 0.927 
Notes.  Country refers to user group, either U.S. or French and 
report type refers to one of three report formats (AS = internal 
control report format established by the PCAOB; NL = the AS 
internal control report format without a limitations paragraph; and 





We use univariate results to identify the specific differences 
in mean ratings of the internal control report formats between U.S. 
and French users, summarized in Table 2.  Panel A of Table 2 
indicates that significant differences exist between U.S. and French 
users in the readability dimension when the report format includes 
fraud wording (p<0.05).   Inclusion of the auditor’s responsibility 
for fraud also significantly increases U.S. users’ readability rating 
when compared to the AS format (p<0.05).   Panel B of Table 2 
presents similar results for the reliability dimension.  With respect 
to the FW report incorporating fraud wording, the differences in 
mean ratings for readability and reliability between U.S. and 
French users differ significantly (p<0.10) and for U.S. users the 
difference in mean ratings between the FW and AS format is 
significant (p<0.05).  These results indicate that U.S. users rate 
significantly more favorably the FW format than their French 
counterparts and also more favorably than the AS format. 
Panel C of Table 2 indicates there are no significant 
differences between U.S. and French users along the liability 
dimension.  While the purpose of this paper is not to test the 
efficacy of a limitations paragraph, analyses do include a 
comparison of the AS and FW formats to the NL format.  Tests 
indicate no significant difference between the AS and NL format or 
the NL and FW format.  Thus, we conclude that the limitations 
paragraph is not driving any of the results we report. 
Summarizing the data, we find no differences between the 
U.S. and French users’ perceptions of the internal control report 
when comparing responses related to the AS report format.  These 
findings suggest that an auditor’s internal control report could 
provide value to user groups outside the U.S.  By comparison, U.S. 
and French users differ significantly along the readability and 
reliability dimensions when comparing an auditor’s internal 
control report that contains fraud wording.  This increase in U.S. 
perceptions’ of the report may be because U.S. users’ desire for 
auditor’s to detect fraud and explicit acknowledgement of that 
responsibility provides comfort to readers of audit reports.  In 
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contrast, French users’ perception did not change when comparing 
different report formats perhaps because auditor responsibility for 
fraud detection is codified into law and fully expected regardless of 
the wording in the audit report.   
 
Table 2 
Bonferroni pairwise comparison of mean responses  
(92 U.S. and 72 French subjects) 
Panel A: Readability dimension 
 Report type means  
(std. dev.) 
Difference 
Country AS NL FW AS-NL AS-FW NL-FW 






0.23 0.81** 0.61 






0.27 0.02** 0.29 
Difference 0.12 0.08 0.95**    
       
Panel B: Reliability dimension 
 Report type means  
(std. dev.) 
Difference 







0.42 1.04** 0.62 






0.10 0.12** 0.02 
Difference 0.45 0.07 0.71*    
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Table 2 -continued 
Panel C: Liability  dimension 
 Report type means (std. 
dev.) 
Difference 
Country AS NL FW AS-NL AS-FW NL-FW 













0.14 0.14 0.00 
Difference 0.38 0.26 0.40    
Notes. AS = internal control report format established by the 
PCAOB; NL = the AS internal control report format without a 
limitations paragraph; and FW = the NL internal control report 
format incorporating fraud wording.  
*Significant at p-value <0.10 for one tailed test 




The harmonization between U.S. GAAP and International 
Financial Reporting Standards has been the focus of much 
attention in recent years (for example, Hail et al., 2010a, 2010b; 
Daske et al., 2008; Bradshaw, et al., 2010).  Less quietly, however, 
there has been an ongoing project between the AICPA and IAASB 
to harmonize auditing standards. Therefore, we extend the 
literature on accounting harmonization by studying audit 
harmonization.  In particular, we compared data related to U.S. and 
French users’ perceptions of the auditor’s report on internal control 
of financial reporting along the readability, reliability, and liability 
dimensions.  Specifically, we investigated whether the two groups 
evaluated the report similarly and to what extent the inclusion of 
fraud wording enhanced the users’ perception of the report.   
Our study’s findings make at least two important 
contributions to the ongoing policy debate regarding the 
harmonization of audit standards.  First, our results indicate that 
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U.S. and French users rate the PCAOB AS2 (replaced by AS5) 
required internal control report similarly, with no significant 
differences along the three dimensions.  These results suggest that 
U.S. and French users have similar information needs (not 
surprising given the increasing importance of French equity 
markets over the last 15 years) and thus, auditor’s internal control 
report could potentially be value-relevant for non-U.S. users. 
Second, we found that the inclusion of fraud wording 
increased positively/favorably U.S. users’ perceptions of the report 
along the readability and reliability dimensions, but had no 
significant impact on French user perceptions.  These results 
suggest that fraud wording in an internal control report does not 
favorably increase French users’ perceptions, but does favorably 
increase U.S. users’ perceptions of the readability and reliability 
(audit assurance) dimensions of such a report format (possibly due 
to U.S. users’ sensitivity to fraud caused by some of the accounting 
scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom). These results are not 
surprising because French auditors are legally required to report 
instances of fraud to a public prosecutor (Jedidi & Richard, 2009).  
Thus, from a French perspective, inclusion of fraud wording may 
be considered redundant because of a societal expectation that 
French auditors actively search and detect fraud.  In contrast, some 
of the major accounting scandals around the turn of the century 
(e.g., Enron, Worldcom) appear to have influenced U.S. users to 
believe that fraud detection should be an explicit part of the 
auditors’ responsibility.   
Finally, recognition/inclusion of the auditor’s fraud 
detection responsibility into the auditor’s internal control report 
(FW format) does not appear to increase perceptions regarding 
auditor liability for either user group.  These results are not 
surprising given the legal environment in the U.S. and the 
definition of third party used in France.  That is, users may 
perceive legal liability at an already high level because of the 
litigious nature of a society or by the standards used to define to 
whom the auditor owes liability.         
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Our research is limited, however.  First we use MBA and 
senior undergraduate (accounting/finance) students in our sample.  
While Frederickson and Miller (2004) found significant differences 
between professional investors and non-professional investors in 
the assignment of stock prices based on pro forma and GAAP 
disclosures, Elliot et al. (2007) found that students make judgments 
consistent with non-professional investors when the experiment 
was not an investment decision and had low integrative features.  
Furthermore, in real-world decision contexts, subjects would be 
performing with different pressures, motivations and a broader 
information set.   
Second, our sample is relatively small and consisted of 
participants from limited geographic areas.  Future studies could 
broaden coverage by investigating similar perceptual processes 
related to audit communications in other European countries and 
other continents. In addition, it is not known if the perceptions of 
our sample are reflective of other potential nonprofessional users 
of an auditor’s internal control report.  With that said, however, the 
results should be generalizable and useful in policy debates 
because of the relatively less complex nature of the task used for 
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REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company  
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the 
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC 
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria 
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible 
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting 
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on 
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of 
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on 
our audit.  
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal 
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material 
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s 
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating 
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other 
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procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We 
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.  
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial 
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to 
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only 
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of 
the company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding 
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material 
effect on the financial statements.  
Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial 
reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements on a timely 
basis. Also, projections of any evaluation of the effectiveness to 
future periods are subject to the risk that controls may become 
inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of 
compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.  
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based 
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the 
Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on 
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the Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) criteria.  
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the 
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the 
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows 
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our 
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements.  





REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTING FIRM  
 
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company  
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the 
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC 
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria 
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible 
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting 
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on 
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of 
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on 
our audit.  
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We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal 
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material 
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s 
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating 
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We 
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.  
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial 
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to 
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only 
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of 
the company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding 
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material 
effect on the financial statements.  
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based 
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the 
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Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on 
the Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) criteria.  
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the 
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the 
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows 
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our 
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements.  
Signed: XYZ & Co., CPAs, February 28, 20X6  
FW—Format 
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To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company  
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the 
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC 
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria 
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible 
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting 
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on 
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of 
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on 
our audit.  
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We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal 
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material 
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s 
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating 
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We 
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.  
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial 
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to 
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only 
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of 
the company; (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding 
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material 
effect on the financial statements; and (4) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of error or fraud 
that could have a material effect on the financial statements. 
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based 
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated 
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Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the 
Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal 
control over financial reporting to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding prevention or timely detection of error or fraud as of 
December 31, 20X5, based on the criteria established in Internal 
Control-Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
criteria.  
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the 
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the 
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows 
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our 
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements, which were free of material 
misstatements due to error or fraud. 




1. The message communicated by the above independent 
accountant’s report (on ABC Company’s internal control 
structure) is completely understandable. 
3.   The purposes of the audit of ABC Company’s internal control 
structure are clearly communicated in the above independent 
accountant’s report. 
Reliability Dimension 
2. How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control 
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of 
material errors for the year 19X8? 
5.   How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control 
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of 
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material misstatements due to an irregularity for the year 
19X8? 
7.  How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control 
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of 
material misstatements due to fraud for the year 19X8? 
10. From the above independent accountant’s report, it can be 
concluded that ABC Company’s internal control structure is 
capable of producing financial statements free of material 
misstatements for the year 19X8. 
11. The degree of assurance about the reliability of ABC 
Company’s internal control structure provided by the above 
independent accountant’s report is higher. 
Liability dimension 
4.  The likelihood that the above independent accountant’s report 
will expose the independent accountant (auditor) of ABC 
Company to legal liability is higher. 
6.  The likelihood that the above independent accountant’s report 
on (ABC Company’s internal control structure) will lead to a 
lawsuit against the independent accountant (auditor) of ABC 
Company is higher. 
8.  By issuing the above independent accountant’s report, the 
independent accountant (auditor) of ABC Company assumes a 
great amount of risk. 
9. It is clear from the above independent accountant’s report (on 
ABC Company’s internal control structure) that the 
independent accountant (auditor) of ABC Company is 
assuming a high degree of responsibility.  
 
